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Tort claims based solely on exposure to toxins fit poorly
within traditional tort doctrines,' which usually require a show-
ing of present physical harm before awarding a remedy for in-
jury.2 But since the 1980s, many plaintiffs have sued based on
their exposure to carcinogenic chemicals even though they have
not yet exhibited any cancer symptoms.' In order to provide
plaintiffs a remedy and to deter the producers of toxins, courts
have created new causes of action.4 These include (1) claims
based on an increased risk of disease, which courts allow when a
plaintiff can prove a greater than 50 percent chance of disease;
(2) claims based on fear of disease, which are similar to emotional
distress claims; and, most recently, (3) claims for medical moni-
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' Because of the long period between exposure to toxic torts and the physical harms
that may develop, toxic tort plaintiffs bringing claims solely on the basis of exposure often
are unable to show present physical injury. See Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability
of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollu-
tion Victim Compensation, 35 Stan L Rev 575 (1983). See also Martinez-Ferrer v Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc, 105 Cal App 3d 316, 164 Cal Rptr 591, 595 (1980) (observing that "[tihe
simple fact is that rules developed against the relatively unsophisticated backdrops of bar-
room brawls, intersection collisions and slips and falls lose some of their relevance in
these days of miracle drugs with their... unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-
delayed side effects").
' See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 at 165 (West
5th ed 1984) (Actual loss or damage is required to award damages; "the threat of future
harm, not yet realized, is not enough."). See also Alhino v Starr, 112 Cal App 3d 158, 169
Cal Rptr 136, 147 (1980) ("If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it
generates no cause of action in tort .... Speculative harm or the threat of future harm-
not yet realized--does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.").
See, for example, Bocook v Ashland Oil Inc, 819 F Supp 530, 532 (S D W Va 1993)
(plaintiffs exposed to toxic pollution but manifesting no other symptoms sought recovery
from oil refinery operator); Potter v Firestone Tire and Rubber Co, 25 Cal Rptr 2d 550, 863
P2d 795, 801-02 (1993) (landowners brought an action based solely on exposure against a
tire manufacturer responsible for hazardous waste dumped at next door landfill).
" The courts have recognized the barriers plaintiffs face when required to wait until a
disease manifests itself. Plaintiffs find it hard to prove causation in toxic tort cases be-
cause there is scientific uncertainty about the development of diseases, and often there is
a long period of time between exposure and manifestation of symptoms. Additionally,
when a disease is finally manifested and litigation begins, the plaintiff may be unable to
locate the defendant or the defendant may be insolvent. See Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical
Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims,
63 Ind L J 849, 852-56 (1988).
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toring,5 which compensate presently healthy plaintiffs for the cost
of the medical testing necessary to facilitate the early detection of
diseases caused by toxic substances. These new claims provide
remedies to a plaintiff who has yet to suffer any physical injury,
raising the issue of whether claim preclusion should bar a second
claim for subsequent damages if and when the plaintiff actually
contracts a disease.' As medical monitoring plaintiffs age, more
plaintiffs likely will contract diseases and attempt to bring second
claims. As a result, courts soon will be forced to decide whether
claim preclusion should apply to medical monitoring plaintiffs at-
tempting to bring second causes of action based on the same ex-
posure.
In deciding whether to apply claim preclusion, courts must
examine a number of competing factors. A plaintiff will not bring
an exposure-based suit if she fears a second claim will be pre-
cluded if and when she actually contracts a disease. If the expo-
sure does not eventually lead to manifested physical harm, this
wait-and-see attitude may mean that defendants will not be sued
and hence will not be deterred from producing dangerous toxins.
On the other hand, a blanket allowance of second suits might un-
dermine policies of judicial economy and finality of judgments.
Because medical monitoring is the most recent development
in the field of toxic torts, this Comment examines medical moni-
toring claims in particular. The Comment argues that the rea-
sons for allowing subsequent claims are much stronger in the
context of medical monitoring than in the context of traditional
claims to which claim preclusion is applied. To bring increased
risk and fear of disease claims, for example, plaintiffs must show
present or probable physical injury; accordingly, courts craft
damage awards to cover both present and future harms. In risk
cases, the ability to bring a second claim when sickness occurs
would lead to double recovery. Indeed, in most cases the damages
awarded are intended to compensate for present and future
harms. The medical monitoring context is different. Courts intend
damage awards to medical monitoring plaintiffs to embody only
the cost of medical surveillance-not compensation for future
' The terms medical surveillance damages, medical monitoring damages, and diag-
nostic damages all refer to the costs of medical observation following toxic exposure and
are used by courts interchangeably.
" These new remedies also pose statute of limitations problems. Congress has largely
resolved these problems by enacting statutes that provide that latent effects of exposure to
toxic substances accrue only when the victim discovers the injury. See Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat 1695-
96, codified at 42 USC § 9658 (1994 & Supp 1997) (preempting state statutes of limitation
with a discovery-based standard retroactive to 1980). See also note 89.
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harm. Moreover, precluding second claims in the medical moni-
toring context leads to perverse results. Plaintiffs should be en-
couraged-not discouraged-to sue first for medical monitoring
and later for actual injury (if it develops) rather than to sue pre-
emptively for damages from a disease that may or may not occur.
In this way, the damage award(s) more accurately compensate
the plaintiffs actual harm and better deter toxic polluters. For
these reasons, claim preclusion should not bar subsequent claims
after the entry of a medical monitoring award.
Part I of this Comment briefly explains the nature of in-
creased risk and fear of disease claims and their required bur-
dens of proof. It then examines medical monitoring awards, dem-
onstrating that the unique nature of monitoring claims (com-
pared to other toxic tort-related claims) justifies allowing second
claims upon the disease's manifestation. Part II examines the
claim preclusion doctrine in general. Part III discusses courts'
application of this doctrine to toxic tort claims for increased risk
and fear of disease claims. It then considers the application of
claim preclusion to medical monitoring claims and argues that
the traditional justifications for requiring preclusion do not apply.
This Comment concludes that, even if claim preclusion does apply
to medical monitoring claims, courts may find various grounds for
exceptions.
I. NEW CLAIMS FOR ToxIc TORT PLAINTIFFS
As toxic tort claims based solely on exposure have increased,
courts have fashioned new remedies for toxic tort plaintiffs. These
remedies allow recovery for increased risk of disease, fear of dis-
ease, and medical monitoring costs. Each category of remedy re-
quires a different burden of proof and hence should have a differ-
ent claim preclusive effect.
A. Increased Risk and Fear of Disease Claims
Courts treat increased risk and fear of disease as claims for
the anticipated disease itself. Courts require plaintiffs claiming
increased risk to prove to a "reasonable medical probability,' or
' See, for example, Sterling v Velsicol Chemical Corp, 855 F2d 1188, 1204 (6th Cir
1988) (holding, in an increased risk of cancer claim, that "[w]here the basis for awarding
damages is the potential risk of susceptibility to future disease, the predicted future dis-
ease must be medically reasonably certain to follow from the existing present injury");
Herber v Johns-Manville Corp, 785 F2d 79, 82 (3d Cir 1986) (holding that, in order to stay
consistent with traditional tort doctrine, "a future injury, to be compensable, must be
shown to be a reasonable medical probability").
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greater than 50 percent,8 that the disease will occur as a conse-
quence of exposure. The claim must be based on reliable scientific
evidence and statistics.' In only a few increased risk cases have
courts departed from this "reasonable probability" rule."°
A claim for fear of disease, sometimes pejoratively called
"cancerphobia," covers an alleged present injury-emotional dis-
tress or apprehension-due to the possibility of future disease
caused by the defendant's negligence." A claim for fear differs
from a claim for increased risk in that fear plaintiffs generally do
not need to prove that the disease is more likely than not to oc-
cur." However, most courts require a fear plaintiff to show objec-
tive physical symptoms of emotional distress. 3 Additionally,
8 See, for example, Hagerty v L & L Marine Services, Inc, 788 F2d 315, 319 (5th Cir
1986) (requiring prospective damages to be more probable than not); Pierce v Johns-
Manville Sales Corp, 296 Md 656, 464 A2d 1020, 1026 (1983) (holding that damages based
on future consequences can only be recovered when "there is more evidence in favor of a
proposition than against it"; in other words, "when there is a greater than 50 [percent]
chance that a future consequence will occur. Mere possibility exists when the evidence is
anything less").
' See Mauro v Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp, 225 NJ Super 196, 542 A2d 16, 20-21
(1988) (rejecting increased risk of cancer claim because medical expert was unable to
quantify increased risk or to predict probability of cancer).
"0 See, for example, Valori v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 1985 US Dist LEXIS 12921,
*8-9 (D NJ) (concluding that plaintiff, claiming to suffer from asbestosis, showed reason-
able probability of contracting cancer by offering statistical evidence that he was a mem-
ber of a class of which 43 percent would contract cancer); Brafford v Susquehanna Corp,
586 F Supp 14, 17-18 (D Colo 1984) (concluding that plaintiffs could recover for increased
risk because proof of probable injury from exposure demonstrated that they had "suffered
a definite, present physical injury").
" See, for example, Hagerty, 788 F2d at 318 (allowing reasonable anxiety damages as
long as plaintiff can prove proximate cause); In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp 634, 637 (D
Me 1986) (same); Mauro v Raynark Industries, Inc, 116 NJ 126, 561 A2d 257, 263 (1989)
(allowing recovery where fear is reasonable and causally related to the defendant's negli-
gence).
12 Consider the court's statement in Sterling:
[Tihe central focus of a court's inquiry in [a fear] case is not on the underlying odds
that the future disease will materialize. To this extent, mental anguish resulting
from the chance that an existing injury will lead to the materialization of a future
disease may be an element of recovery even though the underlying prospect for sus-
ceptibility to a future disease is not, in and of itself, compensable inasmuch as it is
not sufficiently likely to occur.
855 F2d at 1206. See also Clark v United States, 660 F Supp 1164, 1175 (W D Wash 1987)
(finding fears to be reasonable although plaintiffs "were not exposed to any actual risk
greater than I in 1 million"), affd, 856 F2d 1433 (9th Cir 1988); Dartez v Fibreboard Corp,
765 F2d 456, 468 (5th Cir 1985) (finding plaintiff "entitled to compensation for mental an-
guish proximately caused by his asbestos exposure, even if such distress arises from fear
of diseases that are a substantial concern, but not medically probable"); Clark v Taylor,
710 F2d 4, 13-14 (1st Cir 1983) (upholding compensatory damages for fear even though fu-
ture damages were very speculative).
See, for example, Friedman v F.E. Myers Co, 706 F Supp 376, 381 (E D Pa 1989)
(holding that, "[i]n the absence of any evidence beyond mere exposure, . . . [plaintiffs']
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many courts further limit the availability of relief by allowing an
emotional distress claim only if the plaintiff is suffering from
other physical injury or compensable harm.'4 While plaintiffs of-
ten argue that mere exposure meets this physical injury require-
ment, only a few courts awarding damages for fear of disease
have agreed."
B. Medical Monitoring Awards
Recognizing plaintiffs' difficulty in successfully proving in-
creased risk or fear claims, courts have made it easier for plain-
tiffs to recover for costs of preventive medical monitoring. 6 Medi-
claims for emotional distress cannot stand"); Ironbound Health Rights Advisory Commis-
sion v Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co, 243 NJ Super 170, 578 A2d 1248, 1250 (1990)
(requiring objective manifestation when emotional distress is not severe and substantial);
Woyke v Tonka Corp, 420 NW2d 624, 627 (Minn App 1988) (requiring medical proof of ob-
jective physical manifestation of emotional distress; personal testimony was not suffi-
cient). But see Bennett v Mallinckrodt, Inc, 698 SW2d 854, 866-67 (Mo App 1985) (holding
that, under Missouri law, "[plaintiffs no longer need to allege a contemporaneous physical
injury to plead a tort action for emotional distress").
" See Wisniewski v Johns-Manville Corp, 759 F2d 271, 274 (3d Cir 1985) (refusing to
allow a fear of disease claim because although plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered
headaches due to their fear of cancer, they "alleged no injuries that stem from exposure to
the asbestos itself"); Maddy v Vulcan Materials Co, 737 F Supp 1528, 1536 (D Kan 1990)
(denying plaintiffs recovery for emotional distress in absence of physical injury); In re Ha-
waii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F Supp 1563, 1569 (D Hawaii 1990) (stating that the
court was "unaware of any authority in Hawaii which permitted the award of emotional
damages in the absence of some underlying compensable harm"); McAdams v Eli Lilly &
Co, 638 F Supp 1173, 1178 (N D Il1 1986) (allowing plaintiff to establish genuineness of
her fear by establishing a physical injury); Sypert v United States, 559 F Supp 546, 548 (D
DC 1983) (stating that under Virginia law, physical injury is generally required, unless
defendant's actions were "willful, wanton, and vindictive").
"S See Herber, 785 F2d at 83-85 (finding that exposure to asbestos was a sufficient ba-
sis for fear claim); Plummer v United States, 580 F2d 72, 74-76 (3d Cir 1978) (holding that
infection of plaintiffs by tubercle bacilli was sufficient physical impact to substantiate a
mental affliction claim for fear of developing active tuberculosis).
In contrast, most courts have held that mere exposure to a harmful substance does not
constitute "injury." See, for example, Adams v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 783 F2d 589,
593 (5th Cir 1986) (rejecting plaintiff's claim for mental distress damages under Louisiana
law because he failed to establish that he sustained an injury from his exposure to asbes-
tos products); Plummer v Abbott Laboratories, 568 F Supp 920, 925-27 (D RI 1983) (find-
ing that plaintiff's ingestion of diethylstilbestrol, which allegedly increased the risk of con-
tracting cancer, did not constitute a physical injury under Rhode Island law); Sypert, 559
F Supp at 548 (concluding that because the plaintiff had suffered no physical injury from
his exposure to tubercle bacilli, he could not recover mental distress damages under Vir-
ginia law); Burns v Jaquays Mining Corp, 156 Ariz 375, 752 P2d 28, 31 (App 1987) (find-
ing that, although plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos, "Ithere can be no claim for
damages for the fear of contracting asbestos-related diseases in the future without the
manifestation of a bodily injury"); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc v Cox, 481 S2d 517, 528-29
(Fla App 1985) (noting that Florida law requires both impact and injury to recover for
emotional distress, and holding that inhalation of asbestos constitutes an impact, but as-
bestosis is necessary to establish injury).
" See Friends for All Children, Inc v Lockheed Aircraft Corp, 746 F2d 816 (DC Cir
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cal monitoring damages are designed to pay for plaintiffs' costs of
medical examinations to facilitate early detection of any toxin-
caused conditions.'7 Payments to medical monitoring plaintiffs
usually are paid out of a fund as the examinations take place.'8
Because medical monitoring claims require less scientific proof of
the probability of actually contracting a disease than increased
risk or fear claims, this avenue of recovery is becoming more and
more popular.'9
1984). Friends forAll Children was one of the first cases in which a court provided a medi-
cal monitoring award. The court recognized the difficulty in "quantify[ing] the amount of
increased risk imposed on an individual who does not yet have a disease." Id at 826.
Similarly, "emotional distress caused by potential risk may also be thought too speculative
to support recovery." Id. Ultimately, the court stated that "[t]he inability of normal legal
channels to provide plaintiffs with the necessary relief to prevent their suffering irrepara-
ble harm provides under these circumstances the classic case [for a medical monitoring
award]." Id at 830.
"See Slagel, Note, 63 Ind L J at 850 (cited in note 4).
's Most courts providing medical monitoring awards have decided that the proper
method of recovery is the establishment of a "medical surveillance" fund from which pay-
ments are made for periodic screenings, rather than lump sum payments to individual
plaintiffs. See, for example, Ayers u Township of Jackson, 106 NJ 557, 525 A2d 287, 314
(1987) (holding that a fid limits the liability of defendants to the expenses actually in-
curred); Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 858 P2d 970, 982 (Utah 1993) (suggesting in-
surance mechanism or court-supervised fond as proper remedy); Burns, 752 P2d at 34
(holding that lump.sum damages are not appropriate in medical monitoring cases).
"While the soundness of medical monitoring awards is beyond the scope of this
Comment, a short discussion may be appropriate. Courts allowing medical monitoring
claims believe that this new remedy satisfies a number of policy concerns: (1) the public
health interest in encouraging early medical testing; (2) possible economic savings real-
ized by early detection and treatment of disease; (3) deterrence of polluters; and (4) simple
fairness-if the defendant has caused the need for check-ups, the defendant ought to be
the one to pay for them. See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F2d 829, 852
(3d Cir 1990); Ayers, 525 A2d at 311-12.
However, medical experts believe that medical monitoring for asymptomatic plaintiffs
will aggravate already escalating health costs. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental
Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Colum L Rev 942, 973 (1988). Abraham notes
that "liability for fear of contracting disease and for medical monitoring expenses[ I are
themselves sufficiently open-ended to contribute to the uncertainty now troubling the in-
surance market." Id. Other critics believe that defendants' resources will run out, leading
to an inability to provide remedies to future plaintiffs who were exposed and injured. See,
for example, Ball v Joy Manufacturing Co, 755 F Supp 1344, 1372 (S D W Va 1990) (not-
ing that "[allowing today's generation of exposed but uninjured plaintiffs to recover may
lead to tomorrow's generation of exposed and injured plaintiffs being remediless"), affd,
958 F2d 36 (4th Cir 1991). Other critics are concerned that, because the general public is
regularly exposed to all sorts of unhealthy contaminants in the environment, the recogni-
tion of medical monitoring damages will result in a flood of litigation. See, for example,
John J. Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half Hearted
Embrace, 2 U Balt J Envir L 126, 141 (1992) (recognizing that the cost of medical surveil-
lance damages "could easily amount to industry providing systematic diagnostic medical
care to virtually all Americans").
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1. History and development.
Since the first medical monitoring award in 1980,' courts
have awarded medical monitoring costs in several types of cases
including plane crashes,2' toxic chemical spills,22 prenatal expo-
sure to diethylstilbestrol ("DES"),' and exposure to asbestos,24 in-
secticides,' groundwater contaminants,26 landfill toxins,' poly-
chlorinated biphenyls ('¢PCBs"), radiation,' and human immu-
nodeficiency virus ('"HIV")." Most courts allowing medical moni-
toring claims have viewed such claims as an independent cause of
action; they do not require another compensable injury.3' How-
ever, not all courts have been receptive to this creative remedy.
Some courts have refused medical monitoring claims by adhering
to the traditional tort requirement of showing present physical
injury. 32
Courts that allow medical monitoring claims have used two
separate justifications. First, some courts have held that mere
exposure to hazardous substances, combined with a significantly
increased risk of harm, constitutes the physical injury usually re-
quired in tort cases.' Second, arguing that a medical monitoring
Friends forAll Children, Inc v Lockheed Aircraft Corp, 87 FRD 560 (D DC 1980).
1 See Friends For All Children, 746 F2d 816 (involving a claim on behalf of infant
survivors of a plane crash seeking medical monitoring damages based on increased risk of
brain development problems).
See Hagerty, 788 F2d 315.
" See Payton v Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass 540, 437 NE2d 171 (1982).
See, for example, Patton v General Signal Corp, 984 F Supp 666 (W D NY 1997);
Bourgeois v AP. Green Industries, Inc, 716 S2d 355 (La 1998).
See Villari v Terminix International, Inc, 677 F Supp 330 (E D Pa 1987).
See Merry v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 684 F Supp 847 ( D Pa 1988).
See Ayers u Township of Jackson, 202 NJ Super 106, 493 A2d 1314 (1985), affd in
part and revd in part, 106 NJ 557, 525 A2d 287 (1987); Habitants Against Landfill Toxi-
cants v City of York, 15 Envtl L Rep 20937 (Pa Ct CP York County 1985).
See In re Paoli, 916 F2d 829.
See Cook v Rockwell International Corp, 755 F Supp 1468 (D Colo 1991).
"See Doe v City of Stamford, 241 Conn 692, 699 A2d 52 (1997).
22 See In re Paoli, 916 F2d at 851-52 (deciding that, under Pennsylvania law, medical
monitoring alone is a valid cause of action); Elam v Alcolac, Inc, 65 SW2d 42, 209 (Mo App
1988) (finding that "[c]ompensation for necessary medical expenses reasonably certain to
be incurred in the future rests on well-accepted legal principles").
2 See, for example, Ball v Joy Technologies, Inc, 958 F2d 36, 39 (4th Cir 1991) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs could not recover medical monitoring damages because they failed to
demonstrate that they were suffering from a present physical injury); Catasauqua Area
School District v Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 11316, *2 (E D Pa)
(holding that victims of exposure to toxic tort substances could not seek medical monitor-
ing absent some present manifestation of a disease or some reasonable likelihood of con-
tracting such a disease); Theer v Philip Carey Co, 133 NJ 610, 628 A2d 724, 733 (199,3)
(holding that victim who was indirectly exposed to asbestos did not suffer injury and was
therefore not entitled to medical surveillance damages).
See, for example, Friends For All Children, 746 F2d at 825 (stating that because
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claim is not a traditional tort, other courts have not required any
physical injury at all.
Of the courts that allow medical monitoring claims, most re-
quire medical monitoring plaintiffs to show only: (1) exposure to
hazardous substances; (2) the potential for injury; (3) the need for
early detection and treatment; and (4) the existence of monitoring
and testing procedures that make early detection and treatment
possible and beneficial.'
To prevail in a medical monitoring suit, plaintiffs are not re-
quired to prove that the probability of disease is greater than 50
percent. For example, in Ayers v Township of Jackson," the de-
fendants contended that a claim for medical monitoring could not
be sustained if the plaintiffs risk of injury was not sufficiently
likely. 7 The court disagreed, holding that for a medical monitor-
ing claim to be recognized, the plaintiff is not required to meet
the same burden as that required for an increased risk claim.'
2. Current status.
While the Supreme Court has ruled neither in favor nor
against medical monitoring claims in general, it recently refused
to allow a medical monitoring claim in a Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act ("FELA")39 case. In Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Co v Buckley," a railroad employee sought medical monitoring
damages to pay for the extra medical check-ups he expected to
plane crash caused by defendant exposed plaintiff to risk of serious brain damage, "even in
the absence of physical injury [plaintiff] ought to be able to recover the cost for the various
diagnostic examinations proximately caused by [defendants] negligent action"); Bocook v
Ashland Oil, Inc, 819 F Supp 530, 537 (S D W Va 1993) (holding that Kentucky does not
always require a plaintiff to prove a demonstrable physical injury in order to recover dam-
ages-exposure, combined with a significantly increased risk of harm, is sufficient); Doe,
699 A2d at 54-57 (concluding that a claimant who has suffered actual exposure to life
threatening infectious diseases in a work-related incident should be able to recover ex-
penses associated with reasonable medical testing and treatment).
See, for example, Patton, 984 F Supp at 673-74 (holding that New York recognizes a
cause of action for medical monitoring even in the absence of medical evidence showing
presence of asbestos in plaintiffs body); Burns, 752 P2d at 33 (holding that, despite the
absence of any physical manifestation of disease, plaintiffs should be entitled to medical
monitoring). For a thorough overview of judicial treatment of medical monitoring costs,
see Kalas, 2 U Balt J Envir L 126 (cited in note 19).
Merry, 684 F Supp at 850 (providing the first three requirements); In re Paoli, 916
F2d at 852 (adding the fourth requirement).
106 NJ 557, 525 A2d 287 (1987).
525 A2d at 304.
Id.
FELA is a statute that permits a railroad worker to recover for a physical injury re-
sulting from his employer's negligence. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat 1404
(1939), codified at 45 USC §§ 51 et seq (1994).
521 US 424, 117 S Ct 2113 (1997).
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have as a result of his exposure to asbestos-laden insulation
dust.4' The Supreme Court refused to allow this separate cause of
action, expressing concern that determining monitoring costs
"will sometimes pose special 'difficult[ies] for judges and juries,"42
due to "uncertainty among medical professionals about just which
tests are most usefully administered and when."43 While the
Court acknowledged that "tens of millions of individuals may
have suffered exposure to substances that might justify some
form of substance-exposure-related medical monitoring," it em-
phasized that uncertainty as to liability could cause the courts to
be flooded with minor cases, and defendants would be subjected
to the threat of unpredictable and possibly unlimited liability.'
Also, the Court pointed out that for many plaintiffs the costs of
medical monitoring might already be covered by employers or
outside insurance.
Metro-North is not binding on state courts because in the
usual toxic tort case-where a federal statute is not implicated-
the decision of whether or not to allow medical monitoring dam-
ages depends on state law.4" Nonetheless, some commentators
claim that Metro-North demonstrates that courts are moving
away from common law medical monitoring claims." In fact,
however, lower courts have continued to allow medical monitor-
ing claims to be brought after Metro-North, suggesting that they
have not found the Supreme Court's reasoning persuasive. For
example, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently allowed shipyard
employees who were allegedly exposed to asbestos to bring an ac-
tion to collect the costs of future medical monitoring." In another
case decided after Metro-North, the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut allowed a workers compensation claimant to recover expenses
associated with medical testing after being exposed to HTV and
"Metro-North, 117 S Ct at 2121-24.
2 Id at 2123, quoting Consolidated Rail Corp o Gottshall, 512 US 532, 557 (1994).
"Metro-North, 117 S Ct at 2123.
Id.
See, for example, Patton, 984 F Supp at 674 (allowing a claim for medical monitor-
ing subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-North); Bourgeois, 716 S2d at
360 (same); Doe, 699 A2d at 54-57 (same).
"See, for example, Shawn A. Copeland, Joseph C. Kearfott, and D. Alan Rudlin, Cur-
rent Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation, SC 64 ALI-ABA 33, 68 (1998) (claiming that "the over-
all picture painted by the [Metro-North] decision is not a bright one for the future of the
medical monitoring cause of action-at least under federal common law"); Andrew R.
Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 Brooklyn L Rev 1 (1998) (claiming that the
Metro-North decision places medical monitoring "at a crossroad" and arguing that medical
monitoring claims should be required to meet increased risk standards).
Bourgeois, 716 S2d at 360.
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tuberculosis, even though he had not yet contracted either dis-
ease.
48
These cases tend to refute the argument that Metro-North
represents a general trend away from recognizing a cause of ac-
tion for medical damages. Moreover, Metro-North can be distin-
guished from usual toxic tort cases in two respects. First, it in-
volved a cause of action based on a particular federal statute,
whereas most medical monitoring cases involve state law; and
second, it considered a lump sum payment, whereas most medical
monitoring awards require an account from which medical ex-
penses are deducted as they are incurred.49 For these reasons, it
is unlikely that the persuasive effect of the decision represents a
death knell for medical monitoring claims nationwide.
II. TRADITIONAL CLAIM PRECLUSION DOCTRINE
Because courts award increased risk, fear, and medical moni-
toring damages before a plaintiff actually exhibits any symptoms
of actual disease, these new remedies create serious questions as
to whether a court may recognize a second cause of action if and
when a plaintiff actually becomes ill. Generally in tort law, a sec-
ond claim based on the same occurrence or transaction as the
first cause of action is barred by the claim preclusion doctrine.'
Claim preclusion (referred to historically as "res judicata"51)
prevents the litigation of a second claim arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as a previously litigated claim. If a
claim arising out of the occurrence was available in the first
cause of action, the plaintiff does not have a second chance to
bring that claim, even if the plaintiff did not actually litigate it at
Doe, 699 A2d at 54-57. See also Sinclair Oil Corp v Dymon, Inc, 988 F Supp 1394,
1399 (D Kan 1997) (allowing plaintiffs claim for medical monitoring damages against a
former lessee who produced hazardous waste on his property); Gutierrez v Cassiar Mining
Corp, 64 Cal App 4th 148, 75 Cal Rptr 2d 132, 134-36 (1998) (awarding medical monitor-
ing costs to a cement plant worker exposed to asbestos fibers); Dragon v CooperIT. Smith
Stevedoring Co, Inc, 1999 La App LEXIS 48, *19 (allowing plaintiff class's medical moni-
toring claims based on exposure to asbestos).
" The Metro-North court condemned the use of lump sum awards in the medical moni-
toring context, noting an "expressed uneasiness with a traditional lump-sum damages
remedy" and several courts' express limitations on such a remedy. 117 S Ct at 2122. See
also note 18.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17-19 (ALI 1982) ("Second Restate-
ment").
" The term "res judicata" has largely been supplanted in modern usage by "claim pre-
clusion," the term favored by the Second Restatement. Use of "claim preclusion" accords
with the modern system of notice pleading and reduces confusion stemming from the use
of "res judicata" to refer either to claim preclusion singly or to claim and issue preclusion
together. See Moore's Federal Practice (3d) § 131.1011][b] at 131-16-131-17 (Matthew
Bender 1997).
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that time. 2 The Supreme Court expressed this doctrine in Crom-
well v County of Sac:'
IT]he judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the
claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and
those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose.'
Thus, in order for claim preclusion to apply, three require-
ments must be met. First, there must have been a final judgment
on the merits.' Second, the prior action must have involved the
same parties or those in privity with them." Third, the prior ac-
tion could have involved the claim subsequently being brought. 7
While the claim in the second litigation may be based on a differ-
ent legal theory or may seek a different kind of relief than the
claim in the first litigation, claim preclusion turns on the right to
join the claim in the original action. The claim need not have
been actually litigated; it need only have been available to the
plaintiff in the first suit.-%
Defining what rights and remedies are to be considered part
of the same "claim" as an earlier cause of action is the critical in-
quiry for purposes of claim preclusion analysis. Most courts follow
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments ("Second Restatement")
and find all rights and remedies with respect to any part of a par-
ticular "transaction" to be within the same cause of action. 9 In
See generally id § 131.10[11][a] at 131-15.
94 US (4 Otto) 351 (1876).
Id at 352.
See Moore's § 131.30-131.32 at 131-84-131-127 (cited in note 51).
See id §131.40-131.41 at 131-128-131-167.
See id § 131.20-131.24 at 131-33-131-84.
,See id § 131.10[3][c] at 131-19-131-20. See also Second Restatement §§ 17-18, 24-25;
Brown v Felsen, 442 US 127, 131 (1979) (Claim preclusion "prevents litigation of all
grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regard-
less of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.").
" See, for example, Nevada v United States, 463 US 110, 130 n 12 (1983) (citing Sec-
ond Restatement § 24 comment b, as support for the doctrine that causes of action are the
same if they arise from the same transaction). The Supreme Court has long accepted the
equation of claim and transaction. See, for example, United Mine Workers v Gibbs, 383 US
715 (1966); Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp, 349 US 322 (1955); American Fire &
Casualty Co v Finn, 341 US 6 (1951); Reeves v Beardall, 316 US 283 (1942). A small mi-
nority of courts still use old tests such as whether the same wrong infringed on the same
legal right in both suits. See Gonsalves v Amoco Shipping Co, 733 F2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir
1984) (In a single cause of action, there is "but a single wrongful invasion of a single pri-
mary right of the plaintiff. ... A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlaw-
ful violation of a right which the facts show."), quoting Baltimore Steamship Co v Phillips,
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explaining what constitutes a transaction, the Second Restate-
ment notes that the definition is pragmatic and that courts
should give weight to such considerations as "whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business under-
standing or usage."0
Under the transaction test, plaintiffs usually cannot "split" a
cause of action into two or more separate claims, regardless of the
number of theories or forms of relief, the number of primary
rights that have been invaded, or the variations in evidence
needed to support the different legal theories." Of particular
relevance to medical monitoring claims, a transaction includes all
harms-past, present, and future.
The Second Restatement also states that a plaintiff must re-
cover all of her damages in the first action, including future dam-
ages that are reasonably likely to ensue: "It is immaterial that in
trying the first action he was not in possession of enough infor-
mation about the damages, past or prospective, or that the dam-
ages turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess of
the judgment." An example demonstrates this point:
A brings an action against B for negligently causing injury to
A [in a collision] .... Verdict is given for A for $100 and
judgment is entered thereon. Thereafter it appears that A's
injuries are more serious than proved at trial. A is precluded
by the judgment from maintaining a second action against B
for the collision."
According to this traditional view, a plaintiff must claim all
of her damages resulting from the same transaction in one suit-
she cannot bring a later claim when further damages develop.
Hence, traditional application of claim preclusion would seem to
bar a suit based on actual development of the disease when the
plaintiff has already brought a suit for medical monitoring dam-
ages resulting from the same exposure, because the same under-
lying transaction-exposure to the toxin-provides the basis for
both claims.
This claim preclusion is not absolute. In a toxic tort case, a
judge may choose to depart from the- traditional preclusion rules
274 US 316, 321 (1927).
' Second Restatement § 24.
81 Id § 25 comment a.
Id § 25 comment c.
Id § 18 comment b, illus 1.
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based on fairness concerns.' However, a decision based on fair-
ness is subject to the strong criticism laid out by the Supreme
Court in Federated Department Stores, Inc v Moitie,' in which
the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that claim preclusion
must give way to "overriding concerns of public policy" and "sim-
ple justice." The Court held that the claim preclusion doctrine
was not left to the discretion of the courts and stated:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation. ...
[The] doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice
or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours.
It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public
policy and of private peace, which should be cordially re-
garded and enforced by the courts. 7
Moitie prevents federal courts, at least, from attempting to avoid
claim preclusion on the grounds that its application is unfair or
too harsh. 8
The Moitie Court upheld the power of lower courts to influ-
ence the later claim preclusive effect of their judgments, as long
as the exception is based on grounds other than simple fairness. 9
Courts can achieve this by stating as part of their judgment in
the first suit that the decision does not preclude a second claim
when injury develops." The effectiveness of a judge's reservation
of the plaintiff's right to a subsequent claim may "conceivably be
impaired by statutes or rules regarding dismissals of actions,
which should be consulted." 1 However, a close look at the lan-
guage of case law and secondary authorities reveals a strong ar-
gument that claim preclusion may not apply in medical monitor-
ing cases, even in the absence of a reservation by the first court.
Furthermore, even if claim preclusion does apply, courts hearing
the initial exposure claim may have grounds other than fairness
on which to reserve the right to a future claim based on actual
See text accompanying notes 105-11.
452 US 394 (1981).
Moitie v Federated Department Stores, Inc, 611 F2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir 1980).
Moitie, 452 US at 401.
"Id ("The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual
judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case. There is simply 'no prin-
ciple of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary prin-
ciple ofresjudicata.-), quoting Heiser v Woodruff, 327 US 726, 733 (1946).
" For examples of grounds other than fairness on which courts have declined to find
claim preclusion, see Part III.B.2.c-d.
"' Second Restatement § 26(c). See also Ayers, 525 A2d at 300 (hearing an exposure
claim and reserving the plaintiffs' right to bring a second claim when disease is mani-
fested); Burns v Jaquays Mining Corp, 156 Ariz 375, 752 P2d 28, 31 (App 1987) (same).
71 Second Restatement § 26 comment b, Rep Notes.
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development of disease. The next Part considers these argu-
ments.
III. CLAIM PRECLUSION IN THE ToXIC TORT CONTEXT
This Part examines the application of traditional claim pre-
clusion analysis to medical monitoring cases, showing that the
unique nature of medical monitoring claims, coupled with policy
considerations about adequate compensation for plaintiffs and
deterrence for defendants, weigh in favor of allowing medical
monitoring plaintiffs to bring second suits for damages if disease
develops. It then identifies several exceptions to the traditional
claim preclusion doctrine that courts can employ to deny the
claim preclusive effect of medical monitoring claims.
A. Claim Preclusion in the Increased Risk and Fear of
Disease Context
Because medical monitoring claims are somewhat similar to
increased risk and fear of disease claims, it might seem promising
to examine judicial application of claim preclusion to increased
risk and fear of disease claims. Unfortunately, courts awarding
recovery for increased risk or fear of disease rarely discuss
whether future claims would be precluded.
The few courts that have considered the claim preclusion
question explicitly in increased risk and fear of disease cases
have provided that a suit for the actual development of disease is
an action separate and distinct from one based on mere expo-
sure." These courts usually state that they are not choosing to
make an exception to the claim preclusion doctrine but rather
that claim preclusion simply does not apply in latent disease
cases.73 For example, in Devlin v Johns-Manville Corp,74 a New
See, for example, Hagerty v L & L Marine Services, Inc, 788 F2d 315, 320 (5th Cir
1986) (denying increased risk claim while suggesting that any future developments of can-
cer be treated as a separate cause of action); In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp 634, 637 (D
Me 1986) (allowing present recovery for fear of cancer and predicting that this recovery
would not preclude a future claim for actual cancer); Anderson v W.R. Grace & Co, 628 F
Supp 1219, 1231-32 (D Mass 1986) (rejecting claim for increased risk and holding that re-
covery for future illnesses that stem from the same disease as existing ailments must be
brought in the present case whereas future suits for illnesses resulting from different dis-
ease will not be precluded); Mauro v Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, 225 NJ Super 196,
542 A2d 16, 19-20 (1988) (reaching the same conclusion as Anderson under New Jersey
law); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc v Cox, 481 S2d 517, 520 (Fla App 1985) (refusing to al-
low increased risk action but expressly providing a second cause of action if plaintiff actu-
ally contracts cancer due to exposure to asbestos).
See, for example, Ayers, 525 A2d at 300 (stating that the claim preclusion rule is
"literally inapplicable" to toxic tort claims). For commentary proposing allowing second
suits in increased risk and fear of disease cases, see Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern La-
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Jersey court found that exposure and cancer were two separate
claims, based on an affidavit from the Chief Medical Examiner of
Maryland stating that "[i]t is a medically accepted fact that an
individual who has been diagnosed with the disease of asbestosis
[because of exposure] will not inevitably contract [cancer]."
Hence, because the cancer may or may not result, the actual
manifestation of disease allows for a cause of action separate
from the earlier exposure claim."5
The Fifth Circuit has allowed a subsequent claim based on
the plaintiffs difficulty in winning the earlier exposure-based
suit. In Hagerty v L & L Marine Services, Inc," the court ex-
pressed its concern that if the plaintiff was unable to prove injury
based solely on exposure and was later precluded from bringing
suit once cancer actually developed, he would be left completely
without remedy."? Many other courts simply reserve the plaintiffs
right to a subsequent claim without explaining their reasoning."
B. Claim Preclusion in the Medical Monitoring Context
As with increased risk and fear of disease claims, most courts
hearing medical monitoring claims have failed to discuss the later
claim preclusive effects of those claims. Courts that have dis-
cussed the issue have usually determined that claim preclusion
should not apply-that is, the plaintiff may bring a second cause
of action if and when she contracts a disease. 9 In Ayers, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that claim preclusion
tent Disease Cases:A Proposal forAllowing Second Suits, 103 Harv L Rev 1989 (1990).
7' 202 NJ Super 556, 495 A2d 495 (1985).
495 A2d at 502 (finding exposure and exposure-related cancer to be separate be-
cause "each may exist apart from the other").
7, 788 F2d 315 (5th Cir 1986).
Id at 320-21. See also Mauro, 542 A2d at 19-20 (reserving the plaintiffs right to a
second claim because of the plaintiffs potential difficulties in proving a claim based solely
on exposure).
"' See Eagle-Picher, 481 S2d at 529 (stating that "[t~he plaintiff's right to sue for can-
cer damages if and when he contracts the disease is reserved, and such a suit will not be
subject to the rule against splitting causes of action," without giving any reasons for the
reservation); In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp at 637 (stating only that any recovery for
emotional distress is for "present damages" and hence does not bar a cause of action for
cancer, should it ultimately develop).
" See, for example, Hagerty, 788 F2d at 320 (holding that "[a]t least in the toxic
chemical or asbestos cases, the disease of cancer should be treated as a separate cause of
action for all purposes," after awarding damages for medical monitoring and denying
claim for increased risk); Burns u Jaquays Mining Corp, 156 Ariz 375, 752 P2d 28, 31 (App
1987) (holding that second cause of action for future damages is not precluded by prior
litigation based on exposure).
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cannot sensibly be applied to a toxic tort claim filed when
disease is manifested years after the exposure, merely be-
cause the same plaintiff sued previously to recover for...
other injuries. In such a case, the rule is literally inapplica-
ble since... the second cause of action does not accrue until
the disease is manifested; hence it could not have been joined
with the earlier claims."
In the cases in which courts have indicated their judgments
would not preclude future claims if an illness develops, the courts
have also awarded "quality of life," property damage, 2 and fear
awards." Because these courts have not considered medical
monitoring claims in isolation, other courts may have difficulty
finding clear guidance from these cases.
1. A simple view: Applying traditional claim preclusion
doctrine in the medical monitoring context.
The problems with applying claim preclusion in the medical
monitoring context may not be immediately apparent to courts,
and they may be tempted simply to follow classic claim preclusion
doctrine and end their analysis there. Indeed, there is some
weight behind an argument in favor of applying general claim
preclusion doctrine in the medical monitoring context, based ei-
ther on the policy of encouraging finality of judgments or on the
persuasive power of claim preclusion rulings from federal courts.
As will be developed in Part III.B.2, however, this argument is ul-
timately not compelling, as there are several reasons to treat
medical monitoring claims differently from other kinds of claims.
a) Finality of judgments. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that claim preclusion serves "vital public interests"'
and is a "rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public
policy and private peace, which should be cordially regarded and
enforced by the courts. ' Strict claim preclusion fosters finality
525 A2d at 300.
"Id at 293-94.
Burns, 752 P2d at 32.
Hagerty, 788 F2d at 317-19.
Moitie, 452 US at 401. See also Heiser v Woodruff, 327 US 726, 733 (1946) (holding
that there is "no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court
of the salutary principle of res judicata"); Reed v Allen, 286 US 191, 201 (1932) (explaining
that anything other than a strict application of claim preclusion would result in uncer-
tainty and confusion and undermine the conclusive character of judgments).
" Hart Steel Co v Railroad Supply Co, 244 US 294, 299 (1917) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Kessler v Eldred, 206 US 285, 289 ("If rights between litigants
are once established by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction those rights
must be recognized in every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to respect, by
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and thus reduces the possibility of harassment by litigation.
Plaintiffs are forced to take "one shot" at recovery rather than
dragging out litigation by bringing several separate suits based
on a single event or occurrence. Finality also conserves judicial
resources.' Court dockets are overcrowded, and courts can ill af-
ford to provide second and third chances to plaintiffs who have
already had a first.' Finally, promoting finality of judgments
provides defendants with some (eventual) peace of mind.' If
plaintiffs can bring second (and third and fourth) claims on the
same underlying conduct, defendants remain potentially liable
forever.8
9
b) Federal claim preclusion case law. Several federal cases, in
addition to the Second Restatement, seem to support application
of the traditional claim preclusion analysis in the medical moni-
toring context. As developed in Part Ill.B.2, however, these cases
do not conclusively determine that plaintiffs who make medical
monitoring claims should be subsequently barred from bringing
claims based on development of the disease.
In Gideon v Johns-Mansville Sales Corp,' the Fifth Circuit
outlined the prohibition against splitting a cause of action:
those who are bound by it."). The Court in Kessler went on further to state that allowing
second suits destroys rights determined in the first action. Id.
8 See Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 (1980) (stating that claim preclusion relieves
parties of the cost of multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and encourages reli-
ance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions).
See Brown v Felsen, 442 US 127, 131 (1979) (noting that claim preclusion "encour-
ages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve
other disputes"); Car Carriers, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 789 F2d 589, 596 (7th Cir 1986) ("It
would undermine the basic policies protected by the doctrine of res judicata to permit the
appellants to once again avail themselves of judicial time and energy while another liti-
gant, who has yet to be heard even once, waits in line behind them.").
" See Reed, 286 US at 198-99 ("[Tlhe interest of the state requires that there be an
end to litigation.").
"'However, note that in a "discovery rule" jurisdiction, the defendant would similarly
face an infinite period of liability because the statute of limitations does not begin until
the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to know of, her injury. See note 6. But even in such a
jurisdiction, the court's determination of the statute of limitations depends on whether the
court views the disease as a cause of action separate and distinct from the actual expo-
sure. See text accompanying notes 72-75. If the disease is viewed as a separate cause of
action, then the statute of limitations will not accrue until the disease develops. If the
claim for disease is inseparable from the claim for exposure, the statute of limitations will
accrue at the time the exposure is discovered. Under the latter regime, the statute of limi-
tations may severely limit a toxic tort plaintiffs recovery if she is required to wait until
she can prove her damages with a reasonable certainty. For a good discussion of the inter-
play between the discovery rule and claim preclusion in toxic tort cases, see Note, 103
Harv L Rev at 1990-98 (cited in note 73). See also Louisville Trust Co v Johns-Manville
Products Corp, 580 SW2d 497, 500-01 (Ky 1979) (holding that a tort action for injury from
latent disease caused by exposure accrues on date disease is discovered); Harig v Johns-
Manville Products Corp, 284 Md 79,394 A2d 299, 304-05 (1978) (same).
761 F2d 1129 (5th Cir 1985).
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[The plaintiff] has but one cause of action for all the damages
caused by the defendants' legal wrong; the diseases that
have developed and will in probability develop are included
within this cause of action, for they are but part of the se-
quence of harms resulting from the alleged breach of legal
duty. [The plaintiff] could not split his cause of action and
recover damages for asbestosis, then later sue for damages
caused by such other pulmonary disease as might develop,
then still later sue for cancer should cancer appear.9
In Gideon, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that he suffered
from asbestosis and was likely to develop cancer as a result of his
exposure to asbestos fibers. He also brought claims based on
anxiety. Although the court recognized that he might develop in-
juries in the future, it stated that his cause of action included all
damages that he had already suffered and those he would suffer
in the future.2
The case may be offered as authority for applying traditional
claim preclusion doctrine, as it emphasizes the importance of con-
sidering all claims arising from the same factual occurrence.
However, its application in the medical monitoring context is
limited; the plaintiff was already suffering one disease-asbesto-
sis-and seeking present damages. This is usually not the case in
medical monitoring claims.
Courts may point to the Supreme Court's decision in Moitie
to justify a strict application of the traditional claim preclusion
analysis. Moitie, however, only criticized reliance on fairness in
denying the claim preclusive effect of a prior suit. Part III.B.2
discusses several grounds other than fairness on which courts
may rely in allowing second suits by medical monitoring plain-
tiffs.
A court applying claim preclusion to medical monitoring
claims could also rely on comment b to Section 18 of the Second
Restatement.93 Comment b states that if a plaintiff recovers a
judgment against a defendant for injuries suffered in an automo-
bile accident, the plaintiff cannot bring another action against the
same defendant if it is later discovered that the plaintiff's injuries
91 Id at 1137 (internal citation omitted). See also Albertson v T.J. Stevenson & Co, Inc,
749 F2d 223, 229 n 3 (5th Cir 1984) ("[A] plaintiff may not split his cause of action and in-
stitute one suit for the damages attributable to past and present harm and institute a sec-
ond suit to recover for future damages when the full extent of the future damages from the
tort becomes known.").
Gideon, 761 F2d at 1137.
"Second Restatement § 18 comment b illus 1.
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were more serious than originally determined.' According to the
Restatement, a cause of action for potential injury is still "avail-
able" even if the injury has not yet occurred; a plaintiff-perhaps
a medical monitoring plaintiff-cannot bring a second claim even
though the injury had not yet occurred at the time of the first
trial. While the Second Restatement is influential, it is important
to note that the Restatement seems to anticipate a tort in which
the plaintiff is already injured at the time the first suit com-
mences. As will be discussed in more detail in Part HI.B.2, be-
cause a medical monitoring plaintiff is not bringing a claim for
present physical injury, the Restatement is not necessarily dis-
positive in this context.
2. A better view: Treating medical monitoring
claims differently.
While it is possible for a court to find some justification for
the application of traditional claim preclusion principles, there is
a strong argument against the blind application of claim preclu-
sion to every newly develped tort claim, including claims for
medical monitoring damages suffered as a consequence of expo-
sure.9' This argument is based on several important policy goals
and finds considerable support in the decisions of numerous
courts.
a) The special nature of medical monitoring claims. Perhaps
the strongest argument against claim preclusion in the medical
monitoring context-and the one that requires the least deviation
from traditional preclusion doctrine-stems from the unique na-
ture of the medical monitoring award. As the Third Circuit rec-
ognized in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation:s "The in-
jury in an enhanced risk claim is the anticipated harm itself. The
injury in a medical monitoring claim is the cost of the medical
care that will, one hopes, detect that injury.' A court permitting
medical monitoring damages expressly decides not to compensate
for future injury but instead to compensate only for the cost of
monitoring. Therefore, when a medical monitoring plaintiff
brings a second claim, there is no risk of double recovery. The
first recovery compensates only the cost of medical examinations
Id, cited in Moore's § 131.10[2) at 131-17 (cited in note 51).
For commentary arguing for a split cause of action rule in latent disease cases, see
David G. Poston, Note, Gone Today and Here Tomorrow: Damage Recovery for Subsequent
Developing Latent Diseases in Toxic Tort Exposure Actions, 14 Am J Trial Advoc 159, 161-
76 (1991); Note, 103 Harv L Rev at 1998-99 (cited in note 73).
9916 F2d 829 (3d Cir 1990).
" Id at 850.
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aimed at detecting the onset of disease. The second recovery com-
pensates for the losses incurred when the disease actually devel-
ops.
This avoidance of double recovery is a critical difference be-
tween medical monitoring recovery and recovery for increased
risk or fear of disease. Judges hearing increased risk and fear of
disease claims require either a present injury or a high probabil-
ity of injury in the future. The judge or jury essentially awards
compensation for future injuries, so long as the injuries are not
too speculative.
In contrast, since medical monitoring courts do not require a
50 percent probability of eventual disease, courts do not limit re-
covery to those cases in which the disease is likely to actually oc-
cur. They do not consider future injuries that may result if and
when the plaintiff develops a disease. In fact, they expressly rec-
ognize that the plaintiff may or may not contract a disease; the
relative chances of either are irrelevant. Instead, the court recog-
nizes a separate and discrete injury: the plaintiff's present costs
of medical monitoring that have resulted from the defendant's
negligence.
Because of the unique nature of medical monitoring claims,
courts can reconcile allowing subsequent claims once the disease
develops with the traditional Restatement approach. The Second
Restatement states that claim preclusion usually prohibits a sec-
ond cause of action because the award in the first action is in-
tended to encompass the entire damage award for the entire in-
jury:
Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable
wrong extends into the future and will be felt beyond the
date of judgment, the damages awarded by the judgment are
nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the
entire injury .... It is immaterial that in trying the first ac-
tion [the plaintiff] was not in possession of enough informa-
tion about the damages, past or prospective.98
In contrast, medical monitoring costs are not "supposed to
embody the money equivalent of the entire injury." Medical moni-
toring awards cover the costs of monitoring and nothing more.
Because medical monitoring awards are not supposed to include
the damages for the entire injury, they do not fit within the Sec-
ond Restatement's justification for refusing a second cause of ac-
tion for future damages.
" Second Restatement § 25 comment c (emphasis added).
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b) Policy arguments for a claim preclusion exception. Society
benefits in several ways when courts allow medical monitoring
plaintiffs to bring a second cause of action. In a successful medi-
cal monitoring case, the court awards the plaintiff only the costs
of medical examinations. Because these payments usually come
out of a fund as the examinations take place,99 the plaintiff re-
ceives an amount exactly equal to the costs of the current injury
(the need for examination). When a plaintiff actually becomes ill,
she can sue for a damage award equal to her new injury (the cost
of treating the disease). This process ensures that at all times the
damage award equals the actual injury.
If plaintiffs know they will also be able to bring a second
claim if and when they contract a disease, they are probably more
likely to bring medical monitoring claims based on exposure.
Medical monitoring claims in general further an important public
health interest in fostering access to medical testing for those
with an increased risk of disease. Early diagnosis usually means
better, and less costly, treatment, as well as better chances for
survival. Lower medical costs benefit all health care consumers
and health insurance subscribers.1 " Although some individuals
exposed to toxins may seek regular medical monitoring whether
or not the cost is reimbursed, the "lack of reimbursement will un-
doubtedly deter others from doing so." 1' Although there are costs
associated with allowing litigation of a second claim, they are
trivial in comparison to the societal (and human) costs avoided
due to early detection of disease.0"
Finally, deterrence principles support allowing a second
cause of action. Refusing second suits when a condition actually
is contracted (and when the largest sums of damages are in-
curred) may cause plaintiffs to take a "Wait and see" attitude to
their claims. As a result, potential defendants may avoid paying
all of the costs resulting from their negligence (namely, the costs
of medical testing for plaintiffs they put at risk); in this way, po-
tential defendants may be underdeterred. The Third Circuit justi-
fied its affirmance of a medical monitoring award by calling on
this deterrence principle. "[I]n a toxic tort age, significant harm
"See note 18.
"For a discussion of the medical benefits of early detection, see Freddy Homburger,
John A. Hayes, and Edward W. Pelikan, A Guide to General Toxicology 201 (Karger 1983).
'"Ayers, 525 A2d at 311.
"See Michael Dore, Law of Toxic Torts: Litigation/Defense/Insurance § 7.05 at 7-18
(West 1998) (advising defendants in cases where the need for medical surveillance is con-
ceded to offer to pay for the necessary testing regardless of whether the plaintiff has re-
quested medical surveillance damages in order to reduce the defendant's possible future
damages).
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can be done to an individual by a tortfeasor, notwithstanding la-
tent manifestation of that har..... Allowing plaintiffs to recover
the cost of [medical monitoring] deters irresponsible discharge of
toxic chemicals by defendants."1 3 Because of the difficulties of
proving causation where the disease has manifested itself years
after exposure, many commentators have suggested that tort law
has no "capacity to deter polluters because the costs of proper
disposal are often viewed by polluters as exceeding the risk of tort
liability."' By allowing subsequent claims for disease and
thereby promoting initial medical monitoring claims, courts sub-
ject polluters to significant liability at a time when proof of the
causal connection between the defendant's tortious conduct and
the plaintiff's exposure is more readily available.
c) Claim preclusion exceptions at common law. The common
law exceptions to claim preclusion provide several grounds on
which courts may base denials of the claim preclusive effects of
medical monitoring awards. First, courts often apply a "fairness
exception," holding that policies of equity and fairness can out-
weigh former adjudication concerns. For example, when faced
with the appeal of a second claim brought to settle a dispute in
which both parties to a botched land deal sought title, the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to give the earlier decision preclusive ef-
fect in order to avoid an inequitable result and unclear title to the
land.0" In the original cause of action, the plaintiff had requested
specific performance. The court held that its jurisdiction did not
permit such a remedy.' But because the first case did not ulti-
mately decide who owned the land, it left the title to the land un-
clear. In allowing the second claim to go forward, the court was
especially influenced by the fact that the policies underlying
claim preclusion-protection of the defendant from harassment
and the public from excessive litigation-were not present in the
case. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals allowed a second
claim when the case included a "grave legal question" as to the
defendants' liability to bank stockholders.'
It clearly seems unfair to apply claim preclusion with respect
to a medical monitoring plaintiff when she becomes ill as a conse-
quence of exposure. However, as noted above, the fairness excep-
tion to claim preclusion has recently come under fire from the
'"In rePaoli, 916 F2d at 852.
'"Ayers, 525 A2d at 311. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litiga-
tion, 99 Harv L Rev 1458, 1630 (1986).
'"Adams v Pearson, 411 I1 431, 104 NE2d 267, 271-73 (1952).
' 104 NE2d at 273.
'" White v Adler, 289 NY 34, 43 NE2d 798, 801 (1942).
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Supreme Court in Moitie, in which the Court held that federal
courts must enforce claim preclusion strictly, even if the conse-
quences seem unduly harsh. 8 The Court seemed most afraid of
an erosion of the claim preclusion doctrine that might result if
judges could choose not to honor it at their whim. But despite
Moitie's influence, state courts 9 and even federal courts bound
by its command"0 have tended not to interpret its language to
create an ironclad claim preclusion rule. Without explicitly saying
so, courts have continued to look at fairness when determining
the application of claim preclusion."'
State courts have applied a second exception to claim preclu-
sion for cases in which evidence discovered after trial could have
had a substantial effect on the final judgment. In Louisville &
N.R. Co v Whitley County Court,"' for example, the court granted
the losing defendant a new trial based on new evidence. In the
first trial, the judge ordered the defendant railroad to pay
$10,000 in damages to compensate for causing earth to slide con-
tinuously onto a county highway. After trial, however, the county
was able to remedy the problem by spending only $300. The court
held that the difference between the estimated and actual cost of
repair constituted sufficient evidence upon which to base a new
trial: "[Nlewly-discovered evidence... applies to any character of
evidence competent and allowable to illustrate and determine an
issue of fact involved.""' Because the verdict was based on in-
complete evidence, the court granted the defendant's motion for a
new trial:
' See text accompanying notes 65-68.
lWSee, for example, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co v Taylor, 31 Ark 62, 858 SW2d 88, 90
(1993) (considering possibility of unfairness and injustice in its application of claim pre-
clusion doctrine); Ayers, 525 A2d at 300 (holding that claim preclusion cannot sensibly be
applied to toxic tort claims); Shelton v Fairley, 72 NC App 1, 323 SE2d 410, 414 (1984)
(stating that "the doctrine of res judicata is to be applied in particular situations as fair-
ness and justice require") (internal citation omitted).
"'See, for example, Thompson v Schweiker, 665 F2d 936, 940 (9th Cir 1982) (recog-
nizing the "importance of res judicata," but stating that "enforcement of [claim preclusion]
policy must be tempered by fairness and equity"); In re Moorenovich, 634 F Supp at 637-38
(holding that claim preclusion cannot sensibly be applied to toxic tort claims). Addition-
ally, a court may still have some flexibility in determining what constitutes a single claim.
See Second Restatement § 26(lXd), (f) (stating that a claim may be split if"plainly consis-
tent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme, or
it is the sense of the scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim," or if
"it is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion of a second ac-
tion are overcome for an extraordinary reason").
' See, for example, Burns, 752 P2d at 30-31.
100 Ky 413, 38 SW 678 (App 1897).
1138 SW at 679.
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The unusually large verdict ... was rendered because the
jury believed, and were induced by the evidence to believe,
the highway could not be reclaimed and preserved without
the expenditure of that sum of money. If the newly-
discovered evidence shows it to be practicable to accomplish
such object at greatly less than that amount, [the damages
verdict should be changed]." 4
The same court made a similar decision in Anshutz v Louis-
ville Railway Co."5 The plaintiff was injured in a railway acci-
dent. She brought a claim against the railway company based on
a surgeon's report that the accident rendered her barren and
caused a tumor in her abdomen, necessitating expensive surgery.
After the jury awarded her $7,000 in damages, Anshutz gave
birth to the "tumor," which was actually a baby boy. The defen-
dant requested a new trial based on the newly discovered evi-
dence, which clearly contradicted the basis of the original judg-
ment. The court granted the new trial:
From an examination of all these cases, the rule is to be de-
duced that where the newly discovered evidence is of such
conclusive nature, or even of such decisive or preponderating
character as that it would, with reasonable certainty, have
changed the verdict, or materially reduced the recovery, a
new trial should be granted, if it is satisfactorily shown why
the same was not discovered and produced at the trial."'
In another case, the Minnesota Supreme Court extended the
newly discovered evidence exception to allow the reopening of a
final judgment once it determined that at the time the judgment
was entered, both parties were laboring under a mutual mistake
of fact. In Simons v Schiek's, Inc," the plaintiff, Simons, fell
while visiting the defendant's business. Although Simons saw a
doctor, no X-rays were taken of his visibly bruised left hip. Four
years after the fall, the parties agreed upon a settlement of the
case for $1,850. However, shortly after the settlement was
reached, Simons began experiencing pain in his hip. A year after
the settlement, he again consulted a doctor and underwent sur-
gery, resulting in medical expenses exceeding $1,850. He brought
a second action, seeking damages for the expenses of the surgery,
loss of income, impairment of future earning capacity, and severe
14Id.
1- 152 Ky 741, 154 SW 13 (App 1913).
", 154 SW at 15.
"275 Minn 132, 145 NW2d 548 (1966).
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pain and suffering. The plaintiff argued that the settlement was
entered into without any knowledge on his part of the future ex-
tent of his injuries.
In response, the defendants made a simple claim preclusion
argument. But the Simons court found a mutual mistake of fact-
neither party knew the actual extent of injury at the time of set-
tlement-and allowed vacation of the first judgment."' The court
stated that "even though the release expressly covered unknown
injuries, it was not a bar to an action for such unknown injuries if
it can be shown that the unknown injuries were not within the
contemplation of the parties when the settlement was agreed
upon." 19
In Simons, a mutual mistake regarding the extent of the
plaintiffs injury was a sufficient basis for hearing the case a sec-
ond time. Similarly, in Louisville & N.R. and Anshutz, the court
allowed a second claim because the original verdicts failed to
compensate for the actual injury. There are also various other
categories of judgments specifically subject to future modification
in light of post-judgment changes in conditions. Judgments
awarding custody and support of children in connection with di-
vorce and injunctions regulating a future course of continuing
conduct are prime examples. 2 In the words of the Second Re-
statement, "In some instances, a judgment may avowedly be ex-
perimental, to be modified ff implementation of its original terms
is impractical."" '
This same reasoning can be applied in medical monitoring
cases. At the time the original claim is brought, the parties can-
not know the true extent of the injury. When evidence later arises
demonstrating a difference in the extent of the presumed injury
and a need for adjustment in compensation, a court should allow
"'The defendant denied the existence of any kind of a mistake. He claimed that the
plaintiff suffered a known injury to his hip which was visible shortly after the time of the
accident and that the hip condition was just an unknown consequence of a known injury.
145 NW2d at 551.
..Id at 552. Courts have created other exceptions to res judicata's preclusive effect.
For example, when the first judgment was obtained by the use of fraud, courts generally
will not consider it binding. See, for example, McCarty v First of Georgia Insurance Co,
713 F2d 609 (10th Cir 1983) (holding that although initial claim against insurance com-
pany for breaching insurance contract by failing to pay insured had been dismissed, a sec-
ond claim would be allowed because the company had wrongfully concealed evidence of the
existence of the insurance contract in the first suit). "Similarly, when there was a... ju-
risdictional defect that should have prevented the first court from hearing the suit, courts
often will hold that the judgment has no preclusive effect." John J. Cound, et al, Civil Pro-
cedure: Cases and Materials 1198 (West 7th ed 1987).
'"See Roger C. Cramton, et al, Conflicts of Laws 453-57 (West 5th ed 1993).
" Second Restatement § 73. These judgments may be subject to post-judgment change
either by their own terms or by provisions of law governing such judgments in general. Id.
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a second claim in order to compensate the plaintiff properly. In
this way, medical monitoring claims differ from increased risk
and fear of disease cases, as well as traditional cases to which
claim preclusion is applied: there, the award of damages includes
compensation for both present and future injuries. In medical
monitoring cases, however, damages are limited to the present
costs of necessary medical testing. There is no attempt to com-
pensate the plaintiff for the development of a disease.
d) Using FRCP 60 as a bar to claim preclusion. Federal and
state courts seeking to deny preclusive effect to medical moni-
toring awards may rely on numerous legal and policy arguments,
in addition to traditional common law exceptions to the claim
preclusion doctrine. Federal courts, however, have still another
weapon in their arsenal. Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a possible means of relief for plaintiffs who suffer
from increased damages after a final judgment has been entered
in a suit based on exposure.'22
Rule 60(b)(2) provides that a court may relieve a party from a
final judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence "which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b).""= The newly discovered evi-
dence must be material to issues tried.2 . and must be likely to
change the outcome of the case.1" A new trial can be granted
based on newly discovered evidence where it appears that such
"This option has been advanced in Moore's: "[D]amages which have increased dra-
matically in scope through no fault of the plaintiff might be the subject of a motion or in-
dependent action for relief from judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
§ 131.23[3][b) at 131-63 (cited in note 51).
'FRCP 60(b)(2).
... Moore's § 60.42[7] at 60-124 (cited in note 51); Longden v Sunderman, 979 F2d 1095,
1103 (5th Cir 1992) (concluding that the existence of agreement between attorneys in class
action regarding reimbursement for fees and expenses was not material to appeal from
court's award of 40 percent of requested legal fees because the court was the final judge of
fees).
"'Moore's § 60.42[9] at 60-125-60-126 (cited in note 51); Second Restatement § 13
comment c ("The res judicata consequences of [judgments granting or denying continuous
relief] follow normal lines while circumstances remain constant, but those consequences
may be affected when a material change of the circumstances occurs after the judgment.
... [If] there has been a later material change of conditions, a new claim may arise upon
the later facts . . .and that claim will be held not barred by the previous judgment.");
Farm Credit Bank of Texas v Guidry, 110 F3d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir 1997) (finding that no
relief from trial judgment was warranted because the party could not establish the prob-
ability that new evidence would have changed the trial outcome); Harris v Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp, 102 F3d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir 1996) (holding that evidence of asbestos expo-
sure could not have changed the trial outcome because plaintiff still would not have been
able to link asbestos products to defendant manufacturer); Hoult v Hoult, 57 F3d 1, 5-6
(1st Cir 1995) (denying relief from the trial judgment because newly discovered published
article would not have changed the outcome of the trial for the defendant).
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evidence was unavailable, but in existence, at time of trial12e A
new trial will not be granted when the newly discovered evidence
was the result of changed conditions since the trial."= Rule
60(b)(2) has been used often by plaintiffs in federal court, but
without much success. Courts have usually found lacking the re-
quirement that the newly discovered evidence be likely to have
changed the outcome of the case."
At the time a medical monitoring claim is tried, the toxins
are in the plaintiff's body. It can thus be said that the "evidence"
of disease already exists, but is simply not immediately evident or
"discovered" at the time of trial. Under Rule 60(b)'s "newly dis-
covered evidence" provision, then, the eventual development of
disease may constitute the "discovery" of evidence necessary to
deny the medical monitoring judgment claim preclusive effect.
Even if evidence of disease is not considered "newly discov-
ered," however, Rule 60(b)(6) also allows relief from a final judg-
ment on the basis of "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." The Restatement proposes a similar
form of relief, providing that "a judgment may be set aside or
modified if.. . [t]here has been such a substantial change in the
circumstances that giving continued effect to the judgment is
unjust." However, courts will grant a Rule 60(bX6) motion only
in "extraordinary circumstances and only when such action is
necessary to accomplish justice."30
The Tenth Circuit found such "extraordinary circumstances"
in Gledhill v Gledhill,'3' a case involving a plaintiff bank and a
'"See Wagner v Loop River Public Power District, 150 Neb 7, 33 NW2d 300, 303 (1948)
("Newly discovered evidence... is evidence in existence at the time of the trial, but which
could not, by reasonable diligence, have been procured."); Johnson v Johnson, 18 Colo App
493, 72 P 604, 604-05 (1903) ("Admitting the allegations of the affidavit to be true, it can-
not be made the basis of a motion for a new trial, as, from the very nature of the case, such
testimony could not have been produced at the trial, as the fact complained of did not exist
at that time.").
'"Johnson u City of Waterloo, 140 Iowa 670, 119 NW 70, 72 (1909) (refusing relief al-
though conditions had changed since the trial because "[i]t is manifest then that the so-
called newly discovered evidence was of matters occurring subsequent to the trial, and
that no new evidence available then had been discovered").
'"See Mitchell v United States, 141 F3d 8, 19 (1st Cir 1998) (finding that new expert
testimony would not have been sufficient to change the outcome of a medical malpractice
case); Mumford v Bowen, 814 F2d 328, 331 (7th Cir 1986) (finding that new evidence
would not change the statute-based outcome). But see Good v Ohio Edison Co, 149 F3d
413, 423-24 (6th Cir 1998) (finding that new evidence did create a material fact that would
have changed summary judgment ruling); Alpern v Utilicorp United, Inc, 84 F3d 1525,
1538 (8th Cir 1996) (same).
"Second Restatement § 73(2).
" Lyons v Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F2d 716, 729 (10th Cir 1993).
13 76 F3d 1070 (10th Cir 1996).
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defendant trustee. The bank received an order allowing it to fore-
close on the trustee's property that it held in lien. However,
shortly before the foreclosure sale, the trustee made a Rule
60(b)(6) motion requesting that the court vacate the order and in-
stead allow the trustee to liquidate the property for the benefit of
all creditors. The court granted the motion because the property
had increased in value by $750,000; the estate could distribute
more money to other creditors if the trustee liquidated the prop-
erty in a commercially reasonable manner than if the bank had
sold it at a foreclosure sale.
132
The D.C. Circuit found an "extraordinary circumstance"
when a party brought forth evidence that would have been "cen-
tral to the litigation."'" In Computer Professionals for Social Re-
sponsibility v United States Secret Service,"' the defendants
brought forth new evidence of underlying facts that were central
to the legal determinations in the first suit." In the first suit, the
court forced the Secret Service to disclose reports regarding the
Service's involvement in a computer fraud investigation. This
judgment was based upon the Service's failure to show a basis for
confidentiality of expectation of privacy of its source." However,
when the defendants later provided that evidence of confidential-
ity, the court applied Rule 60(b)(6) to allow the Service relief from
that judgment." 7
Trial courts retain great discretion in deciding a Rule
60(b)(6) motion; appellate courts will reverse the lower court de-
termination only if they find "a complete absence of reasonable
basis."" Hence, the definition of "extraordinary circumstances" is
subject to great court discretion. In Gledhill, the court looked
mostly to the economic interests of the plaintiff-it was more re-
munerative to liquidate the property than to foreclose it. Com-
puter Professionals, on the other hand, decided that new evidence
"central" to the previous litigation that may have changed the
original outcome may be the basis for 60(b)(6) relief.
While Rule 60(b)(6) is used only rarely, it may provide a tex-
tual hook for a court seeking to allow a second suit based on de-
velopment of disease. The actual development of cancer can be
"'Id at 1081.
'Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility v United States Secret Service, 72
F3d 897, 903 (DC Cir 1980).
172 F3d 897 (DC Cir 1980).
Id at 903.
"'Id at 902.
"7 Id at 903.
'"See Pelican Products Corp u Marino, 893 F2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir 1990).
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logically described as a "substantial change in circumstances" or
an "extraordinary circumstance" under this provision. Cancer not
only alters economic considerations but also provides evidence
central to questions of injury and compensation.
CONCLUSION
Tort law aims to provide compensation to the victim while
deterring the wrongdoer. To ensure that these purposes are
achieved in toxic tort cases, courts have created new causes of ac-
tion, including most recently the awarding of damages for medi-
cal monitoring. Applying traditional claim preclusion doctrine to
these innovative tort remedies, however, may substantially affect
the completeness of the remedy for injured plaintiffs and the ade-
quacy of deterrence for culpable defendants.
While there is superficial appeal in a strict application of
claim preclusion to medical monitoring claims, a more sophisti-
cated analysis leads to the conclusion that an exception to claim
preclusion is consonant with the legal principles and policy goals
underlying the doctrine. To refuse a plaintiff a second claim for
harm actually manifested leaves the victim inadequately com-
pensated and the wrongdoer underdeterred. Courts should there-
fore use the common law exceptions to claim preclusion to deny
preclusive effect to awards of medical monitoring damages.
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